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Abstract 
 
Much has been written about theory and practice in the law, and the tension between 
practitioners and theorists. Judges do not cite theoretical articles often; they rarely 
“apply” theories to particular cases. These arguments are not revisited.  Instead the Essay 
explores the working and interaction of theory and practice, practitioners and theorists. 
 
The Essay starts with a story about solving a legal issue using our intellectual tools—
theory, practice, and their progenies: experience and “gut.”  Next the Essay elaborates on 
the nature of theory, practice, experience and “gut.”  The third part of the Essay discusses 
theories that are helpful to practitioners and those that are less helpful.  The Essay 
concludes that practitioners theorize, and theorists practice.  They use these intellectual 
tools differently because the goals and orientations of theorists and practitioners, and the 
constraints under which they act, differ.  Theory, practice, experience and “gut” help us 
think, remember, decide and create.  They complement each other like the two sides of 
the same coin: distinct but inseparable. 
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OF THEORY AND PRACTICE  
 
TAMAR FRANKEL∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Much has been written about theory and practice in the law, and the tension 
between practitioners and theorists.1  Judges do not cite theoretical articles often;2 
they rarely “apply” theories to particular cases.3  I do not revisit these arguments.  
Instead I explore the working and interaction of theory and practice, practitioners and 
theorists. 
 
Part I of this Essay tells a story about solving a legal issue using our 
intellectual tools—theory, practice, and their progenies: experience and “gut.”  Part II 
elaborates on the nature of theory, practice, experience and “gut.”  Part III of the 
Essay discusses theories that are helpful to practitioners and those that are less 
helpful.  I conclude that practitioners theorize, and theorists practice.  They use these 
intellectual tools differently because the goals and orientations of theorists and 
practitioners, and the constraints under which they act, differ.  Theory, practice, 
                                                           
∗ Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am thankful to Dean Ronald Cass and my 
colleagues, Professors Wendy Gordon and Ward Farnsworth, for their insightful comments to this 
Essay. 
1 See generally Honorable Stephen F. Williams, Limits to Economics as a Norm for Judicial Decisions, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1997) (arguing that economics is not descriptive and value neutral, 
and objecting to the use of economics as a guide to the law); see also Honorable Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 
(1992) (“(I see no reason why law professors should write mediocre economics, or philosophy, or 
literary criticism, when arts and sciences professors could be doing a better job), and as long as other 
law professors continue to do ‘practical’ work.”).  For a description of the conflicts on the subject see 
Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense 
Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996). 
2 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Law Is a Sometime Autonomous Discipline, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 
97 (1997) (stating that judges read many articles but do not cite many. Lawyers do not present law and 
economics arguments in courts. Similarly, law and economics is aloof of the process and substance of 
the law); see also Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
101, 106 (1997) (examining a theoretical model and stating that in practice the model has little use.  
When courts interpret precedents they face the question of whether they are standards or rules. The 
model does not help resolve their issues. Instead courts engage in a kind of practical reasoning, then 
follow precedents). 
3See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 
(1983); see also Norma Thompson, The Decline and Repudiation of the Whole: Notes on Aristotle’s 
Enclosure of the Pre-Socratic World, in 37 THEORY AND PRACTICE 19, 25 (Ian Shapiro & Judith 
Wagner DeCew eds., 1995) (describing the view that practice is nothing more than the application and 
implementation of theories.  Theories are the generalizations and practice is the items that fall within 
these generalizations.  In this view there is no theoretical basis for any practice except that developed 
by theoreticians.  This was also Aristotle’s view:  “Aristotle encourages us to associate theory with the 
divine and practice with the human.”). 
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experience and “gut” help us think, remember, decide and create.  They complement 
each other like the two sides of the same coin: distinct but inseparable. 
 
I.  CREATING A BANK GIC 
 
My story relates to the creation of a bank Guaranteed Interest Contracts or 
GICs, as they are called.  In the early 1980s I served part-time as a consultant to 
Bankers Trust Company, New York.  In the bank I was a practitioner, but many staff 
members viewed me as an academic—not necessarily a compliment.  I remember my 
work on GICs with fondness because it helped me “earn my wings” and become one 
of the group. 
 
GICs emerged with the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”).4  Before ERISA, employers could pay their retired employees the 
promised lifelong pensions from corporate profits, year by year.5  But if employers 
became insolvent, retirees, some of whom worked for forty years believing they had a 
secure retirement, found themselves unsecured creditors and received near nothing.  
Congress reacted to the failure of one very large employer by passing ERISA.6  The 
Act requires employers to fund their future pension obligations, that is, to put aside 
reserves.7  Therefore, pension plans consist of two periods.  A pay-in period during 
the employees’ work years, in which employers contribute to the reserve fund and the 
money is invested, and a payout period, in which retiring employees receive pensions 
from the reserve fund.8  Most employers use the reserve funds to buy lifelong 
insurance annuities for their retired employees.9  
 
In the late 1970s, insurance companies began to offer employers a funding 
mechanism for the pay-in period.10  These are the GICs.  Under the GICs, insurance 
companies (1) accepted from employers the employers’ contributions to the reserve 
fund; (2) paid out all pensions, and death benefits; and (3) paid to the pension plan a 
fixed interest on the net amounts that the insurance companies held.11  
 
For the insurance companies these were lucrative arrangements.  Bankers 
Trust’s personnel wanted to offer the same contracts to their customers-employers.  
However, the general opinion was that GICs are insurance, and banks are not allowed 
to offer this type of insurance.12  
 
                                                           
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
5 See H.R. REP. NO. 93, at 533 (1994), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4652. 
6 See Federal Reinsurance of Private Pension Plans: Hearing on S. 1575 Before the Senate Comm. On 
Finance, 89th Cong. 8 (1966) (noting that after Studebaker plant closed, assets in pension fund 
provided only some workers with pension rights they had earned, and many workers received nothing).   
7 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  
8 See Roger F. Smith, Your Pension Promise, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1992, at 28. 
9 See Milton Zall, Understanding the Risks to Pension Benefits, PERSONNEL J., Jan. 1992, at 62. 
10 See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 
645-46 (2000).  
11 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 9.4 (1991).  These contracts were limited usually to three 
years.  Only the first year was “open” to payments and disbursements.  The next two years were closed.  
At the end of the two years the insurance companies repaid the money with interest.  
12 See N.Y. State Ass’n of Life Underwriters, Inc. v. N.Y. State Banking Dep’t, 83 N.Y.2d 353, 363 
(1994).  
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I was presented with a problem: Is there a legal way for the bank to enter the 
GICs market?  A difference between a practitioner and a theorist comes to light at this 
point.  I did not look for the problem; it came to me; it appeared on my desk.  As a 
theorist I could have chosen this problem, but I was free to look for another 
interesting issue.  An additional difference between the roles of a theorist and a 
practitioner emerges.  As a practitioner I sought a way for Bankers Trust to offer and 
issue GICs.  Failure to find a way would have meant a disappointment, or even have 
been considered a personal failure.  In contrast, as a theorist, it would have made no 
difference to me whether my conclusions and analysis led to one result or another.  
The orientation of my “practitioner self” was to seek a concrete result and solve the 
problem for the bank.  The orientation of my “theorist self” was to seek the truth 
regardless of the effect on the bank.  To be sure, both “selves” must convince others 
of the correctness of their conclusions.  But at Bankers Trust, I had to convince my 
general counsel, the Banking Commissioner, and perhaps the courts.  As a theorist I 
would have had to convince my colleagues.  These audiences do not always follow 
the same criteria for correctness nor do they reward in the same coin. 
 
Returning to the story.  It soon became clear that I had not one but two 
problems.  One problem was whether GICs were insurance contracts, reserved 
exclusively to the insurance industry and prohibited to anyone else.  The other 
problem was whether, even if GICs were not reserved to the insurance industry, the 
offering of GICs was an activity permissible to banks.  This second question arose 
quickly, as a result of experience.  Experience comes with practice.  Practice involves 
repetition.  For anyone working in a bank’s legal department in the 1980s, the 
question of bank powers was a recurrent theme.13  Therefore, the question surfaced 
immediately.  A theorist without practice-based experience in this area of law might 
have asked the same questions only after more, and perhaps, extensive research.  
Further, experience did not merely help me pose the questions; it also served to give 
me a more nuanced understanding of the issues. 
 
My next step was to meet the bank’s staff that proposed the GIC offering.  I 
asked about the precise terms of the arrangement, and especially what were the 
insurance companies’ obligations, time limitations, and financial rewards.  Here again 
experience helped; this time, experience as a theorist.  In the 1970s, I wrote an S.J.D. 
thesis on variable annuities.14  That subject involved distinctions between insurance 
annuities and securities, and required an understanding of insurance.  I remembered 
that insurance laws differentiate between “insurance contracts,” such as life insurance 
policies and annuities, that contain contingencies—real insurance15—and “insurance 
                                                           
13 See, e.g., John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption in Federal Banking Law,18 ANN. 
REV. BANKING L. 221, 313 (1999); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Regulatory Implications of Individual 
Management of Pension Fund: The Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security 
Privatization, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1043, 1068 (1998). 
14 Tamar Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and Separate Accounts, 51 B.U. L. REV. 173 
(1971). 
15 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (McKinney 2001). A life insurance policy and an annuity contain a 
promise to pay upon death or throughout life.  In both cases the insurance company promises payment 
for an undetermined, contingent period.  We do not know when the life of an insured or an annuitant 
will cease. Insurance companies are able to make these promises because, even though they do not 
know when an individual will die, they can ascertain, based on past statistical data, when a percentage 
of a group of individuals will die.  Thus, pooling a large number of insureds or annuitants, insurance 
companies can offer payments to be terminated or triggered by the death of an individual.  In fact, 
those who buy annuities and die sooner than the average pay for those who buy annuities and die later 
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business,” such as brokerage and investment advisory services, in which insurance 
companies are permitted to engage, but which are not real insurance.  These other 
businesses do not involve contingencies.  Insurance contracts are reserved to the 
insurance industry.  Insurance business is not reserved to the insurance industry, and 
anyone who qualified could engage in that business. 
 
This understanding led to the question: Are GICs insurance contracts or 
insurance business?  The New York insurance statute did not explicitly answer the 
question; neither did the courts or legal publications and treatises.16  The only 
evidence that GICs constituted insurance contracts was that Insurance Commissioners 
said so and that only insurance companies offered GICs.  That was not enough for me.  
An examination of the terms of the GICs, as described by the staff of the bank, led to 
the conclusion that GICs did not contain contingencies, but rather consisted of 
obligations tied to fixed interest rates and payment dates (including payments on 
demand).  That was enough for me, but I needed authorities to convince others. 
 
On this issue the history of GICs helped. GICs are the offspring of group 
annuities.17  During the pay-in period, before an employee retires, the reserve fund 
from which the employee’s annuity will be paid is augmented by employers’ 
contributions and by investments.  One type of such investment is the GIC.  No 
insurance contingencies are involved during this phase because no lifelong annuity 
retirement payments are made to the particular employees.18  
 
When insurance companies planned to offer employers such GIC investments, 
they viewed GICs as annuities without contingencies.19  That raised legal 
uncertainties; the companies were not sure that they had authority to issue such 
“contingencies-less” annuities.  Therefore, they asked the New York legislature for a 
clarification, and received it.20  The introduction to the bill that authorized insurance 
companies to offer GICs explained the main reason for the legislation—to allow 
insurance companies to offer so-called annuity contracts without insurance 
contingencies.21  That was sufficient evidence that GICs were insurance business, and 
that anyone could offer them. 
 
The second problem involved not only experience, but also the exercise of 
“gut” or “intuition.”  The question was whether banks could issue GICs.  GICs looked 
like, and were considered to be, annuities shorn of their contingencies component.  
However, an examination of the way GICs actually worked revealed arrangements 
under which insurance companies received money and paid it out on fixed dates or on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
than the average. In life insurance the reverse is true.  Those who buy life insurance and die later than 
the average pay, and continue to pay premiums, for those who buy life insurance and die sooner than 
the average. In addition, the premiums paid on insurance policies and annuity contracts are invested 
and part of the investment return inures to the policy and annuity holders, and the insurance companies 
retain part.  
16 See id. § 1113 (current version at N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1999)). 
17 See Messagephone, Inc. v. Texas Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 966 S.W.2d 133, 
134 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that a “guaranteed interest contract issued to the plan manager remains 
an unallocated group annuity contract”). 
18 See Ariz. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Fund v. Honeywell, Inc., 927 P.2d 806, 808 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1996). 
19 See Frankel, supra note 11, at 368. 
20 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999). 
21 1985 N.Y. St. Legis. Ann. 311. 
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demand, under a certain formula, plus a fixed interest rate on the net amounts held.22  
Stripped of insurance verbiage, which was linked historically to annuities, the 
arrangement emerges under a model.  A model is a species of a theory, a 
generalization that may include more than one item.  Under the umbrella of this 
model rests not only GICs but also bank deposits.  GICs do what deposits do.  The 
same pattern appears in different contexts—an intermediary that receives money and 
pays out money with fixed interest on a specified date. 
 
Now the accepted insurance pattern of GICs could be changed to a banking 
pattern of a deposit.  This exercise is similar to the visual exercise in which two 
profiles facing each other can also be viewed as a vase.  It depends on what pattern 
one focuses to produce the image.  The vision of a GIC as a bank deposit emerged in 
a similar process.  One unlocked the traditional view to discover whether the basic 
features fit another view.  They did. 
 
While the insurance analysis was based on experience, which led to the 
relevant research, the banking analysis was different.  It was not experience that led to 
this new view of the transaction, but a discovery of a pattern—a “gut” or intuition.  
These will be described in more detail in Part II. 
 
The next step was easy: stripping the insurance legalese and substituting for it 
the banking legalese.  With that done, out came a deposit that was not merely the 
equivalent of a GIC, but a banking GIC.  The final step was a visit to the 
Commissioner of Banking to reduce the risk of a new venture into uncharted waters, 
and seek support against a legal attack by the insurance authorities.  The 
Commissioner approved with glee: Insurance Commissioners have been protecting 
their turf against banks and others so zealously!  Banks expanded the use of GICs to 
other purposes with great success.23  Today no one questions their authority and no 
one argues that these are insurance contracts.  The process of conversion involved 
analysis and research based on theory, practice, experience, and a “gut” type of 
pattern recognition. 
 
II.  THEORY, PRACTICE, EXPERIENCE AND “GUT” DECISIONS; HOW DO THEY HELP US 
THINK, REMEMBER, DECIDE AND CREATE? 
 
This Essay does not define theory and practice with utmost precision.  But the 
following definitions are generally correct and are sufficient for the purpose of this 
discussion.  
 
A.  Theory, Practice, and Experience 
 
The dictionary definition of a theory includes words like “analysis,” 
“speculation,” “principle,” “belief,” “hypothesis,” and “assumption.”24  The thread 
                                                           
22 See Messagephone, Inc., 966 S.W.2d at 138 (citing Jonathan L. Mercier & A. Richard Susko, 
Guaranteed Investment Contracts, in LEGAL ISSUES IN PENSION INVESTMENT 291 (Practicing Law 
Institute 1981)). 
23 See Glennie v. Abitibi-Price Corp., 912 F. Supp. 993, 996 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (“A [Bank 
Investment Contract] is the same as a GIC except it is offered by a bank rather than an insurance 
company.”). 
24 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1223 (10th ed. 1999). 
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that connects all these words is, critical thinking and generalization—a general view 
of parts of the world.25  Thus, the two components of theory are thinking in its various 
aspects, and generalization—the recognition of observed or imagined patterns 
covering numerous related details.  
The dictionary definition of practice includes “exercise,” “custom,” “habit,” 
“repeat,” and “perfect.”26  The thread that connects all these words is repetition, 
whether of acting or thinking.  Many of the words defining practice suggest acting on 
an automatic pilot, so to speak, with no independent or critical thinking or attention.  
These words may denote acting or doing with little mindfulness or attention.  That, 
however, is not necessarily so.  An artist practices the piano with great attention and 
concentration.  The practice of the law and medicine in most cases is far from 
routine.27  Therefore, practice is not necessarily mindlessness, but it could be. 
 
Practice produces experience, both for practitioners and for theorists.  
Experience is gained by repeated activities, including thinking.  Practice is generally 
not mere repetition of identical actions, especially if the actions are complex.  Each 
repeated action changes the actors and their product, adding to their experience, which 
refines their performance and enriches their memory. 
 
B.  Practice, Experience and Theory are Closer than Seems at First Blush 
 
Practice is not necessarily devoid of theory. In the story of GICs, the analysis 
of insurance contracts required both practice and experience, as well as modeling and 
generalization.  In fact, practice also constitutes recognized patterns of actions.28  
Practice also involves creativity.  A practitioner discovered the telescope, giving rise 
to later sophisticated theories.29  Thomas Edison innovated by trial and error—a 
practitioner’s approach—and later his innovations were further theorized.30  Theorists 
also practice.  They practice writing; they practice skimming materials to get to the 
core of the substance; they practice judging quickly which conversation will lead to 
interesting discussions and which will not; and when they conduct experiments, they 
                                                           
25 Thinking should be distinguished from paying attention, although attention is important to 
understanding the meaning of theory.  “Attention” is ambiguous in the sense that it may denote 
thinking, but not necessarily critical thinking.  One meaning of attention is obedience: attention to the 
orders or ideas of others.  This might lead to doing what others tell us to do, paying attention to the 
orders but not thinking at all.  Another meaning of attention is more general and includes 
“mindfulness”—focus, alertness, thoroughness, care, fascination.  These words would include paying 
attention not only to the directives of others but also focusing on one’s own thoughts.  All these words, 
however, denote a state of the mind—the use of thinking in a certain way, but not necessarily thinking 
in an independent or creative way. 
26 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 24, at 914. 
27 In fact, the artist when performing, the lawyer when negotiating a complex deal or appearing in a 
difficult case, and the physician when performing heart surgery, are practicing with enormous 
mindfulness and attention. 
28 If the actions are identical, the pattern—the theory, is not very interesting or useful.  One item could 
describe all items.  But if the items are not identical but similar, a theory can be interesting and helpful.  
Thus, “best practices” in industry are theories about recognized patterns of practices. 
29 Hans Lippershey, a Dutch spectacles maker, is traditionally credited with inventing the telescope.  
The Estates of Holland first used the invention for warfare.  Upon learning of the invention, Galileo 
built and adapted a telescope for use in astronomy.  7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 387 (15th 
ed. 1993). 
30 It is not surprising that many creative lawyers crave an academic environment and career, while very 
creative theorists seek to find their questions in the real world. 
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practice the most efficient ways to use assistants and materials.  Most importantly 
practice produces generalizations and theories through the examination of patterns.  
Most theories acquire recognition by tests in practice.  
 
C.  Practice, Experience and Theory are Intellectual Tools for Both Theorists and 
Practitioners 
 
Practice, experience and theory provide efficient tools for thinking, 
remembering, retaining data to be brought up from our memory banks when needed, 
and for effective use of attention.  With these tools humans acquire new data and 
innovative ideas. 
 
We have a limited capacity for memory.  Theories help us retain memory.  
The items we remember are organized in categories forming a hierarchy.  Thus, in 
addition to knowledge and understanding, theories create such categories by grouping 
under the same umbrella many items, and they help trigger the memory of each item.  
Useful theories are simple because they eliminate details that are not deemed relevant 
to the related patterns and help us organize data.  In the case of the GICs, for example, 
it was important to remember that a salient difference between insurance and other 
contracts is the presence of contingencies.  That memory surfaced when we resorted 
to the general definition of insurance, and the sub-definitions of insurance contract 
and insurance business.  In addition, and just as important, theories offer ideas and 
views of the world to enrich both knowledge and perception. 
 
We have a limited capacity for attention.  We are unable to focus on many 
things all at once.  Practice by repetition and resulting habits allows actors to do one 
thing and pay attention to another.  A novice driver must pay full attention to driving, 
more so than a seasoned driver, who can drive while listening to music or speaking to 
the other passengers.  We perform many functions almost automatically, focusing on 
these functions only with the appearance of danger signals.  In addition, and just as 
important, practice produces experience on which shortcuts to memory and ideas are 
built, as described in the following section relating to “gut.” 
 
Thus, both theories and practice help increase our database of knowledge and 
creativity, but they do so in different ways.  Theories bring ideas that usually come 
incrementally and are subject to critical evaluations and continuous revisions.  While 
continuous revisions are time-consuming, theories can result in fewer serious 
mistakes.  It is only when a dramatic change occurs that our theories—our structured 
thinking—must change.  Practice is different.  Because we automatize some of our 
actions or thoughts, we can pay attention to other things.  Practice-based experience 
adds to our data banks and feeds our theorizing.  However, in contrast to theorizing, 
automatic actions and thoughts are not reexamined.  While practice is more efficient 
than theorizing, it may result in significant future mistakes, and when these are found, 
habits must change.  Practice and theory, however, are not entirely distinct.  A well-
accepted theory acquires the force of habitual thinking and may be as hard to change 
as any habit.  Nonetheless, changing a theory involves the habitual tool of critical 
evaluation.  In that respect, changing habits is harder because it requires additional 
critical awareness, which is not involved in gaining habits by practice. 
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D.  Prototypes of Theorists and Practitioners 
 
The objective, direction, constraints, and risks of theorists and practitioners 
differ.  Theorists seek to discover interesting, preferably hidden, problems in our 
complex and puzzling universe.  They strive to understand and explain these 
problems, and sometimes to suggest solutions for them.  Theorists offer ideas or 
hypotheses and prove them true or false, right or wrong.  Regardless of whether they 
are correct or convincing, theorists make others (both theorists and practitioners) 
think, challenge them, and expand their awareness.31 
 
In contrast, practitioners rarely invent problems for their own sake, nor seek 
hidden ones.  The problems practitioners face may be obvious—a conflict among 
parties; a draught; an epidemic; political unrest; a declining corporate profit margin.  
Practitioners focus on achieving concrete results in the real world: winning the case, 
inducing settlement among the parties; managing the water supply; finding a cure; 
seeking an armed or diplomatic solution to the unrest; or rejuvenating the product and 
organisation of the faltering corporation.32  Thus, the focus and objectives of theorists 
and practitioners differ. 
 
The constraints under which theorists and practitioners function also differ.  
While both strive to complete their projects and both are subject to deadlines, of the 
two, theorists have more time to think.  Practitioners must often complete their 
projects faster, and “think on their feet” with no opportunity to ponder, deliberate, and 
review.33  Some practitioners, such as corporate directors, are under a double 
pressure—required by law to be informed and deliberate, yet pressed by the corporate 
environment to meet short deadlines.34  Therefore, practitioners must use shortcuts to 
get quick answers and make quick decisions.  To them, generalizations, theories, good 
organization of materials and ideas, and other time-conserving mechanisms are 
crucial. 
 
Practitioners and theorists act under other constraints.  However, practitioners 
must achieve results under greater imposed constraints beyond their control.35  A 
practising physician’s goal of curing patients is constrained by the patients’ physical 
conditions and behavior, availability of funds, and sometimes, cultural limitations and 
                                                           
31 Practitioners use theories.  In the case of GICs the practitioners at the bank had to contend with the 
far more fundamental policy that divided banking from insurance.  As background for justifying the 
engagement of banking in GICs they needed to understand the implications not only for their business 
but also for the regulators.  These justifications involved the nature of the risks to the bank and the 
absence of insurance risks, which, at that time, it was assumed banks were not structured to cover.  The 
theories concerning the nature of banking and insurance were therefore important to the bank when 
approaching the Banking Commissioner for approval of the GICs.  Arguably, every regulated industry 
must draw on theoretical work on the history, explanation, justifications, and criticism of the regulatory 
structure. 
32  As mentioned before I did not seek the problem of the GIC.  It came to me.  But theorists who found 
the question interesting produced some work on the nature of insurance and the nature of banking.  
Thus, even accounting for gradations and exceptions, one could view theorists as more likely to raise 
and focus on interesting unanticipated problems, and practitioners more likely to offer and focus on 
interesting and unanticipated solutions to problems. 
33 Arguably, law school classroom discussions and perhaps the examinations offers students the 
opportunity to practice thinking on their feet or seat, short-term. 
34 The duty of care that fiduciaries must exercise requires obtaining information and evaluating it, and 
sometimes discussing it with colleagues. 
35 Electricians and billiards players theorize differently from physics experts driven by different aims. 
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beliefs.  Even though judges, like other practitioners, have options and discretion, 
judges must reconcile their decisions with precedents, rules of procedure, and weight 
of evidence.  Their decisions are subject to revisions by higher courts and the 
legislatures, within limits, to the norms of their profession and the pressures of their 
peers.  Lawyers operate under similar limitations, in addition to financial, 
competitive, and political pressures. 
 
In contrast, theorists enjoy more freedom than practitioners.  Many a theory is 
grounded in self-imposed rules, bound by limitations of the theorists’ own making—
the ground rules that they establish to determine true and false, right and wrong.  The 
theories of numbers and logic are of this sort.36  Such theories are not amenable to 
testing in the real world.  Theories exploring right and wrong human behavior, based 
on moral, economic, or other principles, are subject to such “man-made” limiting 
ground rules; so also are theories exploring the purpose of life, the meaning of death, 
the nature of the universe, God, and our relationships to each other.  These theories 
are shaped and bound by human intellectual and emotional constructs: reason, faith, 
and love, and subject to the theorists’ controls.  Not all theorists, however, are as free.  
Theories about how the world was created require real-world proof or disproof, 
directly or indirectly, and are subject to real-world constraints.  Similarly, experiments 
in genetic engineering are limited by the availability of genes and legal limits on 
experiments.  These limitations are beyond the control of the theorists. 
 
Most importantly, theorists are exposed to lesser personal risks than 
practitioners.  Failures are painful, but the failures of theorists are often less final.  
The less “practical” theorists’ work is, the less risk it poses to themselves and to 
others.  Theorists may suffer from failure to convince their colleagues, but opinions of 
colleagues can be wrong or may change.  In contrast, practitioners may suffer from 
failure to achieve their targets—to win the cases; heal the patients. These failures are 
more overt, affect third parties, and are often irreversible and final.  Court cases are 
lost; the patients die.  Thus, practitioners take greater personal risks than do theorists. 
 
E.  The Uses of “Gut” 
 
Both practitioners and theorists use “gut” as a shortcut, timesaving tool.  
Presumably, if they had the time, they could explain their thought process and the 
reasons for their decisions.  This mechanism is similar to the use of abbreviations, 
such as USA, and both practitioners and theorists resort to it.37 
 
More importantly, practitioners and theorists use “gut” as a shortcut, pattern-
searching, thinking tool in situations within complex, adaptive and changing systems.  
In Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity, Dr. John Holland offers the 
building blocks of a theory of complex adaptive systems, usually populated by 
adaptive agents.38  Constant adaptation to other adaptive agents and the system as a 
whole is the major source of complexity and ever-changing rules under which such 
                                                           
36 See GOTTLOB FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC (2d rev. ed., Northwestern University Press 
1968) (1953). 
37 This tendency contributes to the development of a language for both practitioners and theorists, 
which makes it difficult for outsiders to judge the correctness of their “gut” decision, and may require 
rationalization, unless outside proof such as winning in the game of chess or basketball is available.  
38 JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995). 
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agents act.  Many theories, says Dr. Holland, are linear, based on the reasoning by 
“if . . . then.”39  But humans cannot calculate large, constant variations and 
probabilities.  Further, these theories are often based on the assumption that past 
patterns will be replicated in the future.  In many cases these assumptions prove 
invalid.  Other, more sophisticated assumptions may also prove invalid.40 
 
In such situations actors often use “gut.”  They draw on memories of 
experienced actions, decisions, and situations.  Intuition or “gut” tells them which 
approach worked and which did not.41  In the process they search for patterns, patterns 
of patterns, and relationships among them, and this search often leads to creative 
decisions and approaches.42 
 
As Dr. Holland notes, agents in a complex adaptive system, move from a rule 
of “if . . . then,” to a cluster of rules that can then be automated.43  The rules are 
tentative, because other rules are also possible, and the combinations of the rules 
mainly depend on the questions asked.  Thus, rules that emerge from aggregations of 
details can become themselves details to be further aggregated.44  Adaptation to 
changes alters the structure, or strategy, of the system, depending on the system’s 
experience.45  Agents act by rules, and change their rules as experience accumulates.46  
                                                           
39 See id. at 15-16. 
40 The underlying assumptions of theories by Nobel Prize winners, which predicted variations once in a 
thousand years, were proven wrong, leading to the demise of a very large hedge fund. See NICHOLAS 
DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS 
BEHIND IT 182-224 (2001) (describing and analyzing the rise and fall of the Long Term Capital 
Management hedge fund); id. at 203 (suggesting that the sources of trouble were the assumptions 
underlying some of the theories and the automatic risk management systems adopted by the banks, 
which were effective for each bank but devastating for the system as a whole, under certain 
circumstances).     
41 See JEREMY CAMPBELL, WINSTON CHURCHILL’S AFTERNOON NAP 376 (1986).  Jerry Fodor of MIT 
offers a metaphor of psychological modules, which manipulate complex information in the brain.  Id. 
[The modules] may be capable of very elaborate and extremely rapid feats of 
computation, but their range of knowledge is restricted.  Modules do not know as much 
as the brain as a whole knows.  Other, ‘higher’ centers of the brain, such as those 
involved in thinking, judging and imagining . . . share information without 
hindrance. . . . [But] are denied access to the internal operations of the modules and 
therefore must be content to work with the special representations of the world that 
modules provide. 
Id.  When we are faced with very complex situations involving many items that relate to many patterns 
we must break out of single patterns and create a “meta-pattern.” 
42 See Alden M. Hayashi, When to Trust Your Gut, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2001, at 59, 62-64.  
Following a reasoning pattern that is also followed by competitors in business or in law or in any other 
practice does not work.  It is at this juncture that some management personnel, who are very good, stop 
at middle management and do not proceed to the top level.  That is why some lawyers remain at the 
lower level as well.  That subconscious is what distinguishes some people from others. 
43 HOLLAND, supra note 38, at 45-50. 
44 Id. at 10-12.  Cf. Hayashi, supra note 42, at 63 (decisions on school admissions, decisions by doctors 
and parole officers “confirm that professional judgment can often be reduced to . . . rules”). 
45 See HOLLAND, supra note 38, at 9 (stating that a biological organism “fits itself to its 
environment. . . . [E]xperience guides changes in the organism’s structure so that as time passes the 
organism makes better use of its environment for its own ends.”). 
46 See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that “gut” draws partly on the subconscious to sort 
complexity and bring the results to the fore.  “[E]xperience enables people to chunk information so that 
they can store and retrieve it easily,” and helps discern categories of categories and patterns of patterns.  
That is how people can look at the same thing—especially if it is very complex—and see different 
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Aggregation of rules, categorization of patterns, theories, and models, are ways of 
simplifying complex systems by putting similar items together and treating them as 
equivalent.  We discard details, which we decide are not relevant for the particular 
question, and combine the details which we consider bearing on the question. 
 
Top executives often function by “gut,” and engage in pattern searching when 
complexity is great.  Says AOLs Bob Pittman: 
You have to figure out what the picture is.  What does it all mean?  
It’s not just a bunch of data.  There’s a message in there. . . . Every 
time I get another data point I’ve added another piece to the jigsaw 
puzzle, and I’m closer to seeing the answer.  And then, one day, 
the overall picture suddenly comes to me.47 
Pittman also says, “‘your mind continuously processes information that you are not 
consciously aware of, not only when you’re asleep and dreaming but also when 
you’re awake.’”48  “Aha” may be a reaction to something you read and have a feeling 
you already knew.49 
 
In shortcut thinking, experienced practice—the database produced by 
practice—is important to successful outcomes.  The experienced chess player dredges 
from memory the images of winning and losing chessboard situations.  The master 
chess player will be right most of the time.  A less experienced chess player, having 
fewer memories on which to draw, will make wrong moves more often.  
 
F.  Testing Gut Decisions by Reasoning 
 
Successful “gut” decisions depend on an evaluation of their result.  If we can 
determine the correctness of these results easily, then no more is required, and “gut” 
decisions are adopted.  But if we cannot easily test their success, reasoning helps 
double-check the results.  The converse is also true.  “Gut” can help check the 
correctness of reasoning. 
 
For example, a master chess player’s “gut” decision is convincingly correct 
because (1) the master is the sole master of the decision, (2) the chess game 
movements are unambiguous, are fairly clearly correlated, and the feedback from the 
movements is fairly quick and direct, and (3) the result—winning—is clear and 
unambiguous.  Similarly, a basketball player alone throws the ball, even though he 
acts as a member of a team, his action is visible, and the result (ball falls within or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
things each time; as they draw from the same data they see different patterns.  That is how the same 
legal decision can illuminate different ideas at different times). 
47 Id. at 63. The top manager looks at the data a number of times, and like a scientist he tries to discern 
a pattern that is helpful not only to an explanation but also as a basis for a decision to act.  Pittman 
knew from past experience that sometimes the sale of a product ancillary to the main focus of the 
business is where the money is.  Thus, in amusement parks (and movies) most revenue came from 
selling refreshments and other merchandise, not from the admission tickets.  He used this in another 
context at AOL. 
48 Id. at 61. For an illustration in the world of athletics, see Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses 
of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1773-74 (1987) (before a game a reporter asked Martinez what words of 
wisdom his manager told Martinez before the game, and the player responded: “‘He said, “Throw 
strikes and keep ‘em off the bases,’” . . . and I said: “O.K.”.’”  “‘What else could I say?’”  Fish 
observes that what the manager and the pitcher know is “either inside of them or . . . beyond them.”).  
49 Hayashi, supra note 42, at 61, see id. at 61-62 (one CEO places himself at unusual circumstances 
working as a janitor). 
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outside the basket) is unambiguous.  In both cases actors are guided by “gut,” which 
is in turn strengthened and enriched by experience.  In both cases the actors cannot, 
but need not, accurately articulate and rationalize their decision process. 
 
In contrast, physicians and lawyers who act by “gut” cannot be as sure of the 
correctness of their decision because they rarely act alone; credit may be due to other 
than the lawyers’ or physicians’ contributions.  In addition, the details in their 
complex activity are not clearly correlated with one another.  Further, the results of 
their actions are not necessarily directly linked to their decisions.  Other factors can 
contribute or detract from successful results.  Lawyers may lose their cases because 
their clients deserve to lose; patients may die even if the physicians performed 
brilliantly, guided by experienced “gut.”50  The reverse may also be true.  
Notwithstanding bad “gut” decisions, clients could be acquitted and patients may 
survive.  Thus, the successes of lawyers and physicians do not strengthen their 
experience-based “gut” to the same degree that winnings do for the chess master and 
the basketball player.  Even if lawyers and physicians may not be able to fully 
articulate the reasons for their decisions, they may try harder to do so. 
 
Theory and reasoning may lead to unacceptable results that must be checked 
by “gut” and intuition.  We reject a market theory for adoption (“market for babies”) 
or a cost-benefit analysis for a rapist and its victim, or for the prevention of rape.51  
Both are examples of applying simplistic linear theories to highly complex social 
systems, such as placing children in adults’ care, or relationships among the sexes.52  
If we add conditions to the “market for babies” to adjust for experience and “gut,” the 
theory becomes so cluttered with exceptions as to lose its value as a theory—a general 
statement of a part of the universe.  In that case “experience” and “gut” must take the 
lead. 
 
While a habit of theorizing and reasoning does not invariably lead to a correct, 
sensible, or acceptable solution, “gut” does not lead to the promise land either.53  
“Gut” can create a habit of looking for patterns.54  This habit is useful, but must be 
exercised in moderation.  Always looking for patterns may result in not making any 
decisions.  The converse is also true.  Automatically following what seems like a rule 
before the rule’s existence is established may result in wrong decisions.  The 
Washington Post columnist Michael Kelly demonstrates the danger of “gut”-reliant 
decisions.55  After meeting President Putin, President Bush had this to say: “‘I looked 
                                                           
50 Litigation lawyers rely more successfully on “gut” in cross-examination perhaps because 
notwithstanding the variety of witnesses and subject matter of cross-examination, they have immediate 
“feedback” for their questions and lines of inquiry and that strengthens their memory and “gut” 
reactions.  
51 The cost-benefit analysis described here is that among the rapist, who may benefit from the rape 
more than the cost to the raped.  I do not include cases in which the existence of rape is unclear and 
where consent is the issue.  Neither do I include cases in which the allocation of enforcement costs of 
preventing rape are considered as compared to preventing other horrible crimes.  These fringe issues do 
not mask, however, the fallacy of applying cost-benefit analysis to those cases where these tests are 
inappropriate.  An attempt to cover all aspects of life by cost-benefit analysis are self-defeating because 
to do so the terms themselves must be made so broad as to become meaningless. 
52 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-43 (3d ed. 1986). 
53 See CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at 376. 
54 See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 63. 
55 Michael Kelly, Where Sammy Sosa Meets Vladimir Putin, WASHINGTON. POST, June 27, 2001, at 
A25, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49343-2001Jun26.html. 
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the man in the eye; I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. . . . I was 
able to get a sense of his soul. . . . He’s an honest, straightforward man who loves his 
country.  He loves his family.  We share a lot of values.’”56  In a strong reaction 
Senator Helms noted: “‘[President] Putin was far from deserving the powerful 
political prestige and influence that comes from an excessively personal endorsement 
by the president of the United States.’”57 
 
The worrisome thing about President Bush, said Michael Kelly is not his 
mistakes in foreign policy.  In fact, he is effective. 
No, what is worrisome is that Bush—and in this he seems 
dangerously to resemble the foreign-policy-disaster-prone John F. 
Kennedy—does not seem to understand, or care about, the limits of 
gut.  He does not seem to want to bother with the tedious business 
of study and fact-assessment that is the process by which right 
decisions are most often arrived at—which is even then not so 
often.  He does not seem to want to work at the thing.58 
This is precisely the point. 
 
Thus, gut and reason moderate each other.  The balance of their mix varies.  
When the outcome of decisions cannot be easily judged, or when actors’ judgement is 
inconsistent and emotions play an inappropriate part in the decisions,59 logic and 
reason must be brought in as “sanity checks” to help correct mistaken decisions.60  
But when logic and reason run roughshod over “gut” perceptions, producing results 
that “feel very wrong,” we should stop to reexamine them. 
 
G.  Judges and Practitioners Use “Gut,” but Must Rationalize 
 
Judges use “gut” for the same reason that other actors in a complex adaptive 
system use it.  Even though judges are bound by precedents, they choose the 
precedents to which they analogize new situations, such as those involving the 
                                                           
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Emotions play a role in decisions led by “gut” reactions.  Emotions are essential and important in 
honing intuitive abilities to make good decisions.  A gut may send its signals even by a physical 
sensation.  When people “know” that their decision is right their stomach may tighten, or their skin 
tingles.  While they may compete, “balanced emotions are critical to intuitive decision-making.” 
Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62. 
60 Statistical rules often out-perform human judgment because they are more consistent; for example, 
they do not suffer from human moods.  Not all practitioners can utilize “gut” as much as top 
management, although they too must reason and justify their decisions.  Judges and lawyers must 
reason.  Experts are good when they have rules and good categories for recognizing the indexes.  This 
is how intuition is related to awareness and understanding.  A truly good inspired decision requires 
cross-indexing; the use of analogies to unrelated fields.  Many theoreticians may have the intelligence 
but not the “gut.”  “Gut” leads to some extent to theories.  A theory, followed blind, especially when it 
is based on highly complex data, is likely to be wrong, just as a “gut” has a chance of being wrong.  
However, theories may help intuition by highlighting human errors, for example, our tendencies to take 
risks that are too high in order to retrieve losses, that is, not knowing when to cut, or seeing patterns 
where none exist, or feeling overconfident and at the same time not trusting our intuition.  This mix and 
mixed-up human emotions can be clarified by theories. See id. at 62. 
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Internet, or choose among different precedents,61 or among different rationales 
derived from the precedents. 
 
However, judges must rationalize their decisions for the same reasons that 
other practitioners must.62  First, judges should test their “gut” inclinations for 
correctness by using reasoning.63  Many judicial decisions are not unambiguously 
correct.  Their short-term and long-term impact may differ; the criteria for correctness 
of judicial decisions can be controversial, and their effect on society and on the 
litigants cannot be always easily determined.  Moreover, judges act mostly in groups.  
Unless they dissent, their personal “gut” decisions are not publicized and cannot be 
tested for correctness.64  Similarly, practitioners use “gut” but must rationalize.  Like 
top management, legal practitioners create for themselves rules, aggregate the rules 
and adapt them to changes in their environment and in the behavior of other agents 
with whom they interact.  Second, like other lawmakers, judges must communicate to 
others the reasons for their decisions, to guide behavior, establish the rule of law, and 
render the lawmakers accountable. 
 
A combined use of “gut” and reason presents a problem of communication.  In 
contrast to “gut” timesaving mechanism, and to rationalization, this process is hard to 
articulate.65  For example, a master chess player looking at the board and 
contemplating his next move may find a move that “feels” right, without being able to 
explain why it does.  A master ballplayer knows that he ought to throw the ball in a 
certain way, but cannot describe his thought process in making this decision.  Herbert 
Simon says that, “when we use our gut we’re drawing on rules and patterns that we 
can’t quite articulate.  [We may be] aware of the result of the perception, but we’re 
not aware of the steps [that led to them].”66  Intuition, he says, is the “in-between” 
steps that are “mysterious only because we don’t yet understand how it works.”67  
Like the master chess player, judges have “gut” feelings based on unarticulated 
memory of the many cases which they have decided. 
 
                                                           
61 See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 
1450-51 (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)) (noting that 
Posner’s book characterizes the judge’s controlling decision as the “choice as to what the precedent 
shall be”). 
62 In addition law must be communicated to the public, so that people can follow the rules; judges must 
be accountable, to avoid arbitrary and prejudicial decisions. 
63 See Fish, supra note 61, at 1451 (suggesting that judges are bound by precedents and only 
considerations of policy or ethics justify the exercise of choice among choice among precedents). 
64 The correctness of the decisions of a particular court or judge may be evaluated by the size of their 
following, and by their conversion from decisions on the particular facts to general rules and principles; 
that is, to theories.  In this respect judicial decisions are similar to theories.  See KARL P. POPPER, 
OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 13 (2d rev. ed. 1979) (stating that theorists 
desire to show truth and “can never justify empirically” their theories, leading to the question of which 
theory is preferable); id. at 14-25 (offering methods of proof). 
65 See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that “gut” draws partly on the subconscious to sort 
complexity and bring the results to the fore.  “[E]xperience enables people to chunk information so that 
they can store and retrieve it easily,” and helps discern categories of categories and patterns of patterns.  
That is how people can look at the same thing—especially if it is very complex—and see different 
things each time; as they draw of the same data they see different patterns.  That is how the same legal 
decision can illuminate different ideas at different times). 
66 Id. at 63. 
67 Id. 
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Yet lawmakers, especially judges and regulators, must articulate the reasons 
for their decisions in a way that would be shared with the recipients of the 
information: the higher authorities and those subject to the rules.  This tension 
between the use of such a basis for decisions and articulating the reasons for the 
decision has been, and probably will continue to be, a fertile ground for debate.68 
 
The same issue was raised with respect to directors of corporations for similar 
reasons.  To render them accountable for the exercise of power vested in them, 
directors should articulate the reasons for their decisions.  But unlike judges, under 
the “business judgment rule” directors need not rationalize their decisions, provided 
they made these decisions without conflicts of interest, paid attention to the issues, 
received adequate information, and deliberated. 
 
In sum, while gut and reason complement each other they may also 
paradoxically conflict with each other.  They enhance our ability to innovate and 
protect us from more serious mistakes that we are likely to make if we choose to 
follow only one approach or only the other.69 
 
III.  USEFUL AND LESS USEFUL THEORIES FOR PRACTITIONERS 
 
A.  Practitioners Use Theories to Understand and Learn the Contexts of the Problems 
with Which They Deal 
 
Theorists can play the role of “expert witnesses,” to facilitate better decisions 
in the law.  Legal practitioners are “generalists;” their context is as broad and diverse 
as human actions and experiences governed by law.  Theories, like other information, 
educate lawyers in the context with which they deal, and can point to questions, which 
are crucial to the successful achievement of practitioners’ objectives.  Because 
practitioners include, in addition to the bench and the bar, enforcement agencies, 
regulators, legislatures, and policy makers, theoretical works that are not helpful to 
one group of practitioners may greatly help others.  If theorists do not satisfy their 
needs, practitioners do their own theorizing,70 and so do public agencies.71  Congress, 
                                                           
68 It seems that judges’ gut reactions conflict with precedent and legal reasoning only in a few cases. In 
some cases an analysis of the data convinces the judge of the weakness of his initial gut reaction. Other 
cases involve highly individualized decisions, such as sentencing, in which tight and specific legal 
guidelines may be “stretched” to harmonize with the judges’ sense of justice. Judges may face a 
conflict with clear precedent that brings about very offensive results; for example, when a proven 
brutal murderer may be released because a confession brutally forced by police taints all other evidence 
of the murder. When there is no doubt as to the repugnance of the result, judges may seek justifications 
on the fringe of the precedents. When the results are repugnant to the judges but not necessarily as 
clearly repugnant to others, such a fringe justification may be criticized and probably continue to be 
debated for some time, until settled by society. 
69 The extent to which we should balance one approach or another is outside the scope of this paper. 
However, the circumstances in which decisions can be verifiable by results, the extent of the decision 
makers’ experience, and the extent to which the decision makers must rationalize their decisions for 
other reasons, such as accountability, help determine the balance. 
70 In the past ten years numerous law firms have produced summaries, comments, and books prepared 
by their members for wide distribution. These materials also serve as advertising for the firms’ 
available talents. 
71 The Securities and Exchange Commission often hires as its Chief Economist a person from 
academia. 
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for example, has a number of research arms to which it resorts as well as “think 
tanks” that produce theoretical work. 
 
B.  Theories Should be Implemented in Practice Cautiously 
 
Some theorists take their separateness from practices to the extreme.  They 
converse mostly with colleagues and write for colleagues.  They may even assert that 
they are speaking only among themselves; outsiders can listen in, but not interrupt.72  
Some practitioners may reciprocate to the same degree.  
 
While we need not go to this extreme, separating proposed actions by theorists 
is not always a bad idea.  While they offer ideas, theorists are not necessarily the most 
suited to carry out and implement their ideas.  While theories and ideas fuel thinking 
and creating, not all are necessarily suitable for real-world experience in their original 
form.73  To make them work, theories may require a metamorphosis and a transition. 
Ideas may be the spark; but to create a fire, wood and oxygen must be available. 
 
Theories may not materialize in practice as expected.  Theories simplify and 
eliminate some details that may be crucial for successful implementation.  Theories 
may be based on untested assumptions that, when proven wrong, may bring 
catastrophic results.  In the context of chaotic systems, such as the markets or the 
weather, a small faraway event or the flutter of a feather can result in a crash or a 
hurricane.  One example of this type of crash is the demise of Long Term Capital 
Management, a hedge fund that implemented extraordinary ideas of theorists, some of 
whom were Nobel Prize winners.74  Experience refuted one of their assumptions.  
Risk taking, however, was not the exclusive province of the theorists.  One of the 
theorists suggested more caution, in light of the assumption, while the business 
partners decided to take the risk that led to their downfall.75  More importantly, while 
all saw the feather fluttering, no one seems to have predicted the hurricane until it was 
too late. 
 
Another example of a theory that was not actively and quickly adopted relates 
to the role of institutional investors, mainly mutual funds, and pension funds.  These 
institutional investors used to follow religiously the “Wall Street Rule,” which holds: 
if you are dissatisfied with the performance of corporate management whose shares 
you hold: sell.76  Institutional investors were very reluctant to actively remove the 
management or interfere in the operations of the portfolio companies. 
 
                                                           
72 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (addressing the distinction between laws addressed to the general public 
and laws addressed to public officials).  
73 See Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual Capital from 
the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13 (2001). 
74 See DUNBAR, supra note 40, 182-224 (describing and analyzing the rise and fall of the Long Term 
Capital Management hedge fund); id. at 203 (suggesting that the sources of trouble were the 
assumptions underlying some of the theories and the automatic risk management systems adopted by 
the banks, which were effective for each bank but devastating for the system as a whole, under certain 
circumstances). 
75 See id. at 196. 
76 See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 
1994, at 140, 147. 
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Starting about ten years ago, this subject has been the centerpiece of many 
scholarly works.77  Theorists urged institutional investors to change their practice and 
become active in corporate governance proper.78  At first blush their proposed 
approach was logical.  In theory, institutional investors should be active shareholders.  
Institutional investors are “professional shareholders.”  They represent millions of 
small investors who hold shares in the institutional investors’ portfolios.  Institutional 
investors are the best choice to control errant corporate management.  These investors 
are the private sector regulators, certainly superior to government regulators as well as 
to small investors in expertise, sophistication, and desirable self-interest.  Besides, 
with legal voting power in addition to economic power, institutional investors should 
serve the public and at the same time reduce government interference in corporate 
affairs.  As part of their function, they monitor the corporations whose shares they 
hold, and have a significant amount of information about these corporations and about 
others to compare them with.  The sale of a large block of shares can depress the 
market price of the shares to the detriment of investors; and “dribbling” shares into 
the markets may be costly and render the stock prices uncertain.  It makes sense for 
institutional investors as well as for the public interest to render corporate 
management more efficient by taking an active corporate governance role. 
 
These arguments are logical.  They work beautifully in theory, but they do not 
pass the test of practice and experience.  The investment management industry 
rejected the invitation to become active investors.  Even state pension funds, the most 
active of the institutional investors, refrained (after some attempts) from appointing 
their representatives to corporate boards of directors.79 
 
Why was the theory unhelpful in practice?  Is the investment management 
industry simply wrong, following the trodden road that may have been justified years 
ago, but not today?  I believe that, in the view of the industry and the regulators, the 
cost of changing the posture of institutional investors far exceeded the benefits.80  The 
theorists noted the costs involved in these changes, such as significant conflicts of 
interest and insider trading possibility.  But they did not give these costs the weight 
that practitioners and regulators did.  They may have had a more benign view of, and 
stronger belief in, market discipline against financial frauds than the practitioners did.  
The theorists did not experience, for example, the problems of being embroiled in the 
politics of appointing directors. 
 
Further, the self-interest of the two groups differs.  While the theorists desire 
to produce innovative ideas, practitioners wish to produce profits at lower risks.  The 
                                                           
77 See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
78 See Pozen, supra note 76, at 140. 
79 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain 
Benefits, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 349, 355 (2000) (the “institutional investor prefers to consider itself more 
as an investor than a controller. . . .  Today, there are thousands of institutional investors in the United 
States, and only a small fraction of them are regularly involved in issues of corporate governance.”).  
80 See ROE, supra note 77, at 235 (advocating roles for institutions in corporate governance include, 
holding managers accountable, computing the stock markets’ supposed short-term tendencies, and 
coordinating the long-term relational investments of corporations that need to do business together. 
Roe did foresee some of his theory’s limits, such as conflicts of interest, dampening the entrepreneurial 
leadership, and possible increased government involvement in financial planning. Roe did not advocate 
compelling ownership structures but did advocate encouraging them). 
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risk borne by the two groups also differs.  Theorists would not bear the risks of their 
proposals; at most their proposals would be rejected.  The practitioners would bear the 
risks of implementation; failure could be very costly to them.81  Moreover, the 
theorists’ goal differed.  The theorist aimed at maintaining more control over 
corporate management.  The institutional investors and their regulators aimed at 
making sure that the institutions represent investors fairly and maintain investors’ 
trust in them and the system.  The two groups may have had different views of public 
benefits and risks involved in the changing role of institutional investors.  Theorists 
were not as concerned about insider trading as institutional investors and regulators 
were.  These investors, whose main function is to trade in the markets, believed that 
they would face serious problems of insider trading if their representative sat on the 
corporations’ boards.82  Institutional investors are more active in the affairs of their 
portfolio corporations when the costs of the Wall Street Rule become very expensive.  
For example, when the portfolio companies go bankrupt.  In such situations the 
money managers do not stand idly by, but become active in the bankruptcy process to 
protect their investors’ interests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Practitioners and theorists view each other as different.  It is natural for people 
to view what they do as most important.  “Purity” of approach supports self-worth.  It 
limits the number of people involved, encourages exclusivity (e.g., development of a 
language that others cannot understand), and creates a distinctive closed club.83  The 
divide seems to apply also to the audiences whom practitioners and theorists address.  
Each group tends to those who share its attitudes and needs.  
 
Theories and ideas are useful, even if they do not have immediate practical 
value.  They may contribute to practice and challenge our thinking, not only when 
they are true and right, but also when they are false and wrong.  Theories are useful in 
different ways to different practitioners, such as legislators and other policy makers, 
not only to the judges and the litigation bar.84  All practitioners should welcome 
them.85 
 
Practices are tremendously valuable to theorists in search for novel patterns 
that have escaped others.  Practices are also valuable because they preserve our 
attention and help develop innovative approaches to problems.  Theorists should 
welcome them. 
 
Most importantly, we all need the four intellectual tools of theory and practice, 
experience and “gut.”  We need them for thinking, remembering, paying attention, 
and discovering new patterns.  While these mechanisms have conflicting features, and 
we resort to them in different ways, they complement each other.  We cannot help but 
incorporate them, use them, and value them all. 
                                                           
81 The ideas may indeed help practitioners in other contexts, but not in this case, or not at that time.  
82 See ROE, supra note 77, at 119-20. 
83 See Dan-Cohen, supra note 72, at 625. 
84 Edwards, supra note 1, at 34, 44, 55.  “My argument, here, assumes a particular audience for legal 
scholarship—a practitioner seeking to solve a legal problem or a judge preparing to resolve a legal 
dispute . . . .  Id. at 55.  But “the ‘practical’ scholar should seek to integrate theory with doctrine, 
because both are relevant to the practitioner and government decision-maker.”  Id. at 44. 
85 For an insightful article on the subject see Sternlight, supra note 1, at 707. 
